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Abstract
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) are often used for storing pressurant gases on
board spacecraft when mass saving is a prime requirement. Substantial weight savings can be achieved
compared to all metallic pressure vessels. For example, on the space shuttle, replacement of all metallic
pressure vessels with Kevlar COPVs resulted in a weight savings of about 30 percent. Mass critical space
applications such as the Ares and Orion vehicles are currently being planned to use as many COPVs as
possible in place of all-metallic pressure vessels to minimize the overall mass of the vehicle. Due to the
fact that overwraps are subjected to sustained loads during long periods of a mission, stress rupture failure
is a major concern. It is, therefore, important to ascertain the reliability of these vessels by analysis, since
it is practically impossible to show by experimental testing the reliability of flight quality vessels. Also, it
is a common practice to set aside flight quality vessels as “fleet leaders” in a test program where these
vessels are subjected to slightly accelerated operating conditions so that they lead the actual flight vessels
both in time and load. The intention of fleet leaders is to provide advanced warning if there is a serious
design flaw in the vessels so that a major disaster in the flight vessels can be averted with advance
warning. On the other hand, the accelerating conditions must be not so severe as to be prone to false
alarms. The primary focus of the present paper is to provide an analytical basis for designing a viable fleet
leader program for carbon COPVs. The analysis is based on a stress rupture behavior model incorporating
Weibull statistics and power-law sensitivity of life to fiber stress level.
Nomenclature
Symbols
F lifetime distribution function
Pf probability of failure
R reliability
S stress ratio
N number of vessels
6	 fiber stress
6ref fiber stress at burst pressure
t time in hours
td design life
tref characteristic time corresponding to 6ref
P power-law coefficient for stress
R lifetime shape parameter
a Weibull shape parameter for fiber strength
0 power law exponent to represent damage level
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Subscripts
fl, Op, op fleet leaders, operational vessels and operating condition
d, D, crit design, degraded and critical condition
Introduction
Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) are often used for storing pressurant gases
onboard spacecraft. Kevlar, glass, carbon and other more recent fibers have all been used as overwraps.
COPVs with metal liners are susceptible to many of the same failure modes as metallic pressure vessels,
but additional considerations are required to ensure that the vessel has a reliable composite overwrap. Due
to the fact that overwraps are subjected to sustained loads for an extended period during a mission, stress
rupture failure is a major concern. Such failures can occur at loads that are much lower than the static
strength of these vessels. A COPV that fails in stress rupture will burst suddenly without warning leading
to catastrophic consequences such as loss of a vehicle and its crew.
In order to assure safe and reliable operation of such vessels, it is often a requirement to show by
appropriate analyses that the failure probability due to stress rupture is low enough (i.e., the reliability is
high enough) to satisfy predetermined mission requirements. There are a number of models available in
the literature that can be used to estimate the reliabilities of COPVs. However, the model parameters must
be determined from available test data using accepted statistical techniques such as maximum likelihood
or Bayes methods. For example, for Kevlar COPVs there exists a large database of stress rupture lifetime
data that was generated primarily by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Cornell
University and the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and with Kevlar material characterization
contributions from the Y12 Plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories.
These tests have involved single fibers, fiber bundles (yarns), resin impregnated strands (or tows), and
laboratory scale COPVs loaded at a single constant stress level (Refs. 1 and 3 to 6) for times ranging from
a few minutes to many years. Similar data for carbon vessels is largely lacking, thus forcing one to use
other means of establishing stress-rupture lifetime, and mitigation procedures to reduce failure risk
(Ref. 2).
In the absence of sufficient quality stress-rupture lifetime data, an alternative approach often proposed
to mitigate stress rupture risk is to establish a program of so-called “fleet leader” COPVs, that is subscale
vessels that lead the fleet in terms of time or fiber stress level under load and possibly under higher
temperature. Such approaches have been used in the past for both Kevlar and carbon fiber COPVs. For
example flight quality sub-scale Kevlar COPVs were put in a test program at JSC at slightly higher fiber
load level than the actual fleet on the Orbiter before the Space Shuttle missions started. The vessels had
similar wrap patterns and the same material system for the wrap as the fleet vessels on Orbiter (though
recent analysis has shown that the fleet leader fiber stress ratios were actually below those for the largest
vessels in the Orbiter fleet). A few of the vessels were also put under more severe accelerated conditions
by subjecting them to much higher operating temperatures. For the International Space Station (ISS)
program, several carbon COPVs of different sizes were impact damaged prior to placing them in a fleet
leader test program. The vessels were also pressurized to slightly higher loads than the operating loads of
typical ISS COPVs. The program is still ongoing after more than 9 years, and so far no failures have
occurred.
A formal design/analysis procedure for setting up a fleet leader program is, however, not available.
Thus the basis for setting up the number of vessels and the operating conditions for the fleet leaders has
been largely ‘ad hoc’ and based on the particular bias of the program engineer. In the present paper a
formal analytical procedure is developed, based on the classic reliability model (Refs. 1 and 7 to 10) for
COPVs, by which means one can design the number of fleet leaders required and the accelerating
operating conditions (pressure, time, temperature) necessary to meet the goals of a typical fleet leader
program. Typically such goals are to provide legitimate advance warning when risk of failure is becoming
unacceptable (due predictable material degradation but where model parameters imprecise, or due to
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overlooked errors in the manufacturing process), but at the same time not have accelerating conditions
severe enough to result in false alarms.
Fleet Leader Concepts
The main purpose of a fleet leader program is to address statistical uncertainty in forecasting the
reliability of a COPV, which may have been designed and manufactured according to a particular
reliability model to serve for some long design lifetime, td. The key idea is to perform lifetime tests on
several vessels that are either identical to or are accurate scale models of the vessel in service, and to use
some failure rate accelerating condition such as a higher pressure, or a higher temperature or a faster time
accumulation at constant load (which requires that the actual vessel in service lags the fleet leaders by
spending much of its time unloaded). True fleet leaders correspond to the use of exact replicas and
operating conditions of the service vessel but at a higher rate of usage. However, the term ‘fleet leader’ is
also often used to describe scale models put under failure rate accelerating conditions, but this requires
more sophistication in terms of a reliability model that can transform one scale and stress state to another.
One role of fleet leader is to expose potential errors in design, quality control or manufacturing before
they lead to the catastrophic failure in fleet itself. If true, the acceleration in loading conditions should be
severe enough to produce failure of a fleet leader with high probability long before the end of design life;
for example the fleet leader failure probability becomes >0.95. This would sound a so-called ‘true alarm’
that vessels in service appear to have reliabilities for their intended lifetimes that are far less than
originally calculated by the model, which means that some life-shortening factor was overlooked, such as
use of a set of poor quality spools, or pre-preg whose shelf-life had long expired. (For instance the true
vessel reliability is now only 0.995 rather than the 0.999999 or six nines it was originally designed to
meet).
On the other hand, if no such design or manufacturing errors have occurred (beyond the well
characterized material variability and design tolerances), then the accelerating condition should be
moderate enough that the probability of failure of a fleet leader over the lifetime is appropriately low (say
<0.01 or one-in-a-hundred) since such a failure would become a ‘false alarm’ that would initiate a time-
consuming, expensive and inconclusive investigation. Note that in the actual flight vessel application, the
required reliability over the service life may be several nines (e.g., 0.99999 or Pf = 0.00001). Thus the
fleet leader is screening for unanticipated errors in design or manufacturing in a context where the
probability of failure in service is designed to be small to begin with.
A fundamental point is that the degraded reliability level (or future reliability) implied by the failure
of a fleet leader and the time of occurrence is a key consideration in setting the load or temperature
parameters of the failure rate acceleration. For instance, the original design may have called for 0.999999
or six nines reliability, but once put into service, serious corrective action may not become mandatory
until the reliability degrades to below 0.999 or three nines. The reason for such a double standard is that
repair or replacement may itself pose risks that must be taken into account, as well as expenditure of
resources that might better be spent on eliminating the sources of error or uncertainty in future
replacement vessels that originally led to the degraded performance. Such decision aspects must be taken
into account in the initial design of the fleet leader program and the setting of the acceleration factors;
they should not be deferred until after a fleet leader has failed since the decision process will be ‘ad hoc’,
and thus, much less likely to be objective. Conversely if the parameters of the fleet leader program are not
properly set, then whether fleet leaders fail or not will have little meaning in terms of the future reliability
of the vessels in service.
In order to design a service vessel to a high reliability standard one must have a robust reliability
model in terms of service pressure, various design factors and stochastic material properties. This model
should also form the basis for determining failure acceleration factors corresponding to desired low
probability thresholds for false alarms. If the model is (1) known from long experience to accurately
reflect the probability of failure of the service COPV for all relevant lifetimes, and (2) all the parameter
values of the model are accurately known based on an extensive material database, then the fleet leaders
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serve mainly as confirmation of this fact, i.e., they provide some comfort in terms of a safety margin. In
more technical terms, for these conditions to be true requires that all the uncertainty be “aleatory”
(naturally occurring variability that is irreducible) (Refs. 11 and 12), so that the probability of failure
calculations are straightforward for a given pressure level and one only needs to design to the correct
service pressure to get the required reliability.
The more frequent and troublesome situation, however, is where various uncertainties exist in the
vessel design and fabrication, and particularly in the properties of the overwrap materials, mainly because
of lack of sufficient supporting data and the wide variety of possible material combinations as well as
processing and fabrication errors that are possible. For instance, one may have very good information on
how such overwrap materials behave in general, but be unclear about the behavior of this particular brand
of overwrap fiber or manufacturing lot since the factory may be newly built and has an inexperienced
technical staff, or it is a new relatively untested version of fiber. All this may be reflected primarily in
uncertainties in the true values of the overall model parameters, which if significantly different from those
assumed in the vessel design, could significantly compromise the reliability. In technical terms, this
means there is considerable “epistemic” (uncertainty due to lack of knowledge or proper models or Data
etc.) uncertainty (Refs. 11 and 12) to add to the previously mentioned aleatory uncertainty, making
reliability predictions at a high level of confidence problematic.
Fleet Leader Program Modeling Details
Stress rupture life prediction can be accomplished using the so-called classic model as originally
pioneered by Coleman (Ref. 7) and further developed by Phoenix and colleagues (Refs. 5, 6, and 8 to 10)
over the past 27 years. More recently this model has undergone a thorough review during two
independent technical reviews and assessments sponsored by the NASA NESC (NASA Engineering
Safety Center) (Refs. 1 and 2). The model is based on a Weibull distribution framework for strength and
lifetime with the embodiment of a power law to describe damage in a composite versus stress level.
Derivation of the model is available in References (Refs. 7 and 8) where the power-law in stress level
(with temperature dependence) is derived from thermally activated chain scission using a Morse potential
as a model (Ref. 8). In the simplest setting of constant stress applied quickly and maintained over a long
time period, the basic equation for the model is
 

F (t ,op )  1  exp 
t op
	 (1)

t
ref  ref

 J
where F(t, 6) represents the probability of failure at time t. In the above equation the quantity (6op/6ref) is
the ratio of fiber stress at operating pressure to fiber stress at burst pressure (stress ratio), t is time, tref is a
reference time, p is the power law exponent, and R is the Weibull shape parameter for lifetime. The value
for 6ref is determined from the flight COPV burst tests and stress analysis of the COPV. The model is
shown for a single stress level over time, but for more general time histories a memory integral is used to
accumulate damage (similar to Miner’s rule for fatigue) at different stress levels.
In order to address issues specific to carbon fibers, an alternative model has also been proposed and
developed exclusively to address carbon overwrapped vessels which are more common and fast replacing
the Kevlar overwrapped vessels. The model is known as the ‘fiber breakage model’ the details of which
are described in (Refs. 2 and 13). As this model is more complicated, it was decided to use the simple
classic model to develop the analytical framework and illustrate the concepts for fleet leader design. The
principles however are equally applicable to the fiber breakage model as well.
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Stress Rupture Life Distribution Model
To define a successful fleet leader program one must determine, the number of vessels, Nfl, the stress
ratio at which fleet leaders must be in operation, Sfl, and the probability of failure of a fleet leader due to
the inherent and well-characterized natural variability (which would produce a false alarm). The classic
model for the stress rupture lifetime distribution can be used to construct an analytical framework for
designing a fleet leader program. As mentioned before, the probability of failure of a single fleet leader
vessel up to time t0 is well modeled by the lifetime distribution function given in Equation (1) and
rewritten as
 
 
 
r 	


 

	
F ( t;6,6ref , tref , ,  =1— exp 	 t

	
t > 0	 (2)
	
I

ref	 tref
where the parameters are defined as follows
Oref is a reference stress taken as the observed fiber strength at burst at some prescribed loading
rate, or more precisely, the Weibull scale parameter of the ‘delivered’ fiber strength at burst for
a single vessel;
tref is a characteristic time corresponding to Oref (i.e., the projected Weibull scale parameter for
lifetime at the fiber stress O = Oref);

	
	 is the power-law exponent relating lifetime to stress level (i.e., t  O– whereby log O versus log
t plots as a straight line with slope –1/ );
R	 is the Weibull scale parameter observed for life times, which can be measured from stress
rupture tests.
Note that in a burst test, the Weibull shape parameter for fiber stress at burst can be shown to be  ; R , so
there is dependency among the parameters. Likewise Oref and tref are related and depend on the pressure
rate used in the burst tests. This version of the model does not assume previous survival of a proof test of
any kind, though the same principles apply with the appropriate conditional lifetime distribution.
We assume that Nop vessels are to be placed in service at operating pressure pop which produces fiber
stress Oop and fiber stress ratio
	
S
op 
 

op  ref
	 (3)
We also assume there are Nfl fleet leaders to be put in test under controlled but accelerating conditions at
fleet leader pressure pfl (to be determined), which produces fiber stress Ofl and fiber stress ratio
	
Sfl  fl  ref
	 (4)
(In this paper we shall only consider increased pressure or stress ratio as an accelerating condition.)
Uncertainties in the vessel design and fabrication techniques, and in the overwrap materials are reflected
primarily in uncertainties in the true values of the model parameters Oref, tref,  , and R in that some values
might be degraded to varying degrees, in which case the reliability calculation assumed in the initial
design is much too optimistic.
NASA/TM—2009-215685
The two scenarios described in the beginning are formalized as follows:
(1) If the service time on the Nop vessels is intermittent, i.e., only a few days per year at operating
pressure, pop , and the remaining time is spent at greatly reduced pressure with respect to stress-rupture,
then the Nfl fleet leader vessels may be pressurized to a pressure pfl giving the same fiber stress ratio Sop as
in the service vessels (though if the vessels are not identical in design but are scale models, it may be that
6fl ^-' 6op due to Weibull size effect adjustments). This is the situation that applies to the Orbiter fleet
leaders at ambient conditions, and the idea is that whatever the model parameter values, a fleet leader has
a high probability of failure well in advance of failure of a service vessel due to much more rapid time
accumulation. Note that true fleet leaders are identical vessels.
(2) If the service time in the Nop vessels is continuous, then the Nfl fleet leaders must be placed
under accelerating conditions, for instance under a higher pressure giving a higher fiber stress 6fl>6op and
higher fiber stress ratio
Sfl > Sop
	 (5)
Here, the idea is that if the fiber stress ratios in the fleet leaders are high enough (but not too high), then a
error in the materials quality control or design will result in model parameter values sufficiently different
from those assumed in the design that the probability of failure of at least one fleet leader will be high and
much higher that for the vessels in service despite their having material parameter values inferior to those
that had been assumed in the original design.
To simplify matters and illustrate the key concepts we focus on the situation (2).
Fleet Leader Design Approach
The general parameter set is given by
P, "ref , tref,  , a = PP	 (6)
and we will consider two versions, the parameter values used in design, subscripted by ‘d’ and the
degraded parameter set subscripted by ‘D’. Then we will have
Pd , tref,d , Pd , ad = P dP d (design set)	 (7)
PD , tref,D , PD , aD = P DPD (degraded set)	 (8)
In Equation (8) we have a set of degraded model parameters that will cause reduced reliability due to
either design errors or inferior materials in terms of variability or breakdown rate not screened out during
quality control testing. For simplicity, we have not added a subscript to 6ref since this is usually
determined in prototype burst testing and so forms the basis of the fiber stress ratios whether the
properties are actually degraded or not.
First we derive some basic relationships in terms of the design parameters of the model. For a given
reliability, Rd = 1–Pf,d, with respect to survival of Nop vessels over the full design lifetime, td, we first find
the operating stress ratio, Sop, that will provide this reliability. For this we must solve
FNop ( td; Sd6ref, 6ref, tref,d , P d , 0 d )= 1 —Rd 	 (9)
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With the aid of Equation (2), and noting that d = ȕdd, we obtain
 dt (
N
°p  S°p   
 d 	 d	

 
 ln Rd	 (10)tref,d
or
j 
 d 	 1  d
 ln Rd  ln  1  Pfd 
S
°p
 r 	 l d 	 r	 l dN
°p l td /tref,d / 	 N°p ` td /tref,d 1
1  d 	
(11)
 	 
 
 	 
	
Pf ,d 	 0<Pfd « 1

	
,
N
°p  td
 /
tref,d
 

d
Probability of a False Alarm
A “false alarm” signifies that one of the fleet leaders failed due to natural causes. Suppose we wish
to place Nfl fleet leaders on test. It is first necessary to decided on an acceptable false alarm probability of
failure, Pfalse alarm, assuming that the design and materials exactly follow the parameter set, Equation (7),
we assumed above. A reasonable choice might be Pfalse alarm = 0.0 1, that is, one-in-a-hundred chance of a
false alarm. This choice must balance such things as the cost of a false alarm in terms of triggered
investigations and the likelihood a legitimate true alarm will be heeded if the vessels do in fact have
degraded properties. On the other hand, if the value is set too low, the sensitivity of the fleet leaders in
detecting truly degraded vessels is lowered.
Then to determine the operating stress ratio Sfl for the fleet leaders, the following equation must be
solved:
FNfl  t; Sfl6ref , 6ref, tref,d , pd , R d , N°p  = Pfalse alarm	 (12)
Resulting in
 d
	
Nfl  Sf 
d
	
td 	
 ln  1  Pfalse alarm  	 (13)
( tref,d
which gives
1  d	 1 d
Sfl 
  ln  1  Pfalse alarm  	 Pfalse alarm	 0  Pfalse alarm  1	 (14)l dNfl  td
 
/tref,d
 / 	

 
N
.fl  td /tref,d   
 d
Reliability of Sounding a True Alarm
A “true alarm” signifies that one of the fleet leaders failed due to serious problems in design, or
material quality control. Once the operating stress ratio for fleet leaders is established, we must consider
the probability of sounding a true alarm, Ptrue alarm, if indeed the degraded parameter set, Equation (8), best
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characterizes the vessels thus reflecting a serious problem in the design or materials quality control. The
probability of failure of a fleet leader under the degraded set of parameters is given by

 	

D
 t
f
DFNfl  t ; Sfl6 ref , ref , tref,D ,D ,D , N   1  exp N   S 

	
tref,D
	 J
	
D
	 (15)

	
 1  exp  Nfl  Sfl 
D
	
t 
k t >-0
 	 
	

	  	 
tref,D 	
Ij
and thus the probability of a true alarm is
 
 	
 	 
D 
Ptruealarm  1  exp  Nfl  Sfl 
D
	
t
	  , 	 t >-0	 (16)
 	 

	  	 
tref,D 	

The probability of a true alarm depends on the values of the degraded parameters relative to the
original ones, but the problem can be viewed inversely in terms of the desired probabilities of sounding
true alarms, avoiding false alarms and prescribing the level of reduced reliability to be associated with the
degraded parameter values. From previous Equations (14) and (16) we have
 d

  ln  1  Pfalse alarm Sfl
Nfl  td
 /tref,d 
 d
	
1 D
 ln  1  Prue alarm 
Nfl  td
 /tref,D   
D 
f
(17)
or
1 
	
D  d 11
a
  ln  1  Pfalsealami   / d   td /tref d   dD  tref,D /tref,d 
1
l
D
 N  d D  ln  1  Ptruealami  
1^ D
or
D
 ln  1  Ptrue alarm    Nfl	  d  td /tref,d R
D

1
 
 d )  tref,d /tref,D 
D
 ln  1  Pfalsealarm  
D
/
 d
However, 0  Pfalse alarm  1 so that  ln  1  Pfalse alarm   Pfalse alarm and thus
1 D
	

 
D
	 
D
Ptrue alarm  1  exp    Nfl  1 
 
d 	
td 	
 d tref, d 
 Pfalse alarm 
D ^ d 

tref,d
	 ( tref,D
 	 
	

Similarly we can calculate the degraded reliability, RD of the service vessel and this is
(18)
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
	
1 D 
D
D
 ln  RD    Nop 1 

  d 	
td	
 d  tref,d
	
 ln  Rd DI 
 d
	 (19)
  	  	  	 
tref,d 	tref,D
 	 
Since Pf,d = 1–Rd and both 0Pf,D 1 and 0Pf, D 1, i.e., they are small compared to one, then we have
–ln(RD)Pf,D and ln(Rd)Pf,d so that
D ( 	
D
DPf, I Nop	
td
	
 d
 
tref,d
	 (Pf ,d INop D / d 	 (20) 	 ltref,d 	tref,D
1
Taking logarithms of both sides we have

ln Pf ,D D 1  D ln td  (^- df,   (D--)ln (w^ ,d 	 (21)
Nop
	
 d
	
tref,d 	tref,D 	  d
	
Nop

Critical Threshold of Degraded Reliability for Launching Corrective Action
To design a fleet leader program we must specify a critical threshold value of Pf,D below which the
reliability cannot go without triggering corrective action. This can be defined in various ways, but a
convenient way is to define
DcritPf , D ,crit 
 
 Pf ,d 
where 0  Dcrit  1 is an exponent. Then we can consider a special family of ‘critical damage’ parameter
values of the model subscripted as ‘Dcrit’, which, as a group, define threshold values

 Dcrit , tref,Dcrit
 , 

 Dcrit ,  Dcrit 
 

 
Dcrit  Dcrit 	 (23)
Equations (21) to (23) can be combined to arrive at the following relation for critical set of damaged
parameters
	
 
 	   	 
D .	 1  
 Dcri t
ln td
	
 ln tref,d 

 

 
Dcrit 

 
D 	
Pf ,d
	 0
	
(24)
	
c„t
	
 d
	
tref,d 	tref,Dcrit 	  d 	
crit
	
Nop

Then a worse than critical damage set would need to satisfy
 

D 1  PD )ln (_td  ln
tref,d
 

 

(D
 
 D ln 
Pf ,d 
< 0
	 (25)
 d
	
tref,d 	tref,D J	  d 	
crit
	
Nop
(22)
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P 	 4 87600 
1
f ,D ^	
 1.3 
 

 0.0011
19
	

1.79
24 1.3  0.000001 )341 40/
( 0.95  4 (29)
This analysis reveals that the parameters can combine in various ways to cause the same critical
reliability state. Furthermore we can see that success of the fleet leader program in terms of having the
capability to detect a true alarm without a false alarm also depends on the same parameters. Thus we have
 	
 1 
 PD 	 
D 	
D l d 

Ptrue alarm 1  exp Nfl 
td
	
 d ( tref d
	
Pfalse alarm 	 (26)
 	  	  	 
tref,d
	
tref,D 	 N

	

	
fl
	

and the probability of sounding true alarm will depend on the threshold value for the probability of a false
alarm.
Case Studies and Examples
We now focus on some examples to illustrate several points.
Case 1: Kevlar 49/Epoxy Fleet Leaders
Suppose four Kevlar 49 overwrapped vessels are to be put in service, which must have a design life of
10 years, (td = 87,600 hr) at a reliability level of Rd = 0.999999 (six nines) or failure probability, Pf,d =
0.000001. We assume that the critical reliability for corrective action due to discovered damage or
degraded parameter values is 0.999 or the probability of failure, Pf,D = 0.001. Thus D
crit 
 1 / 2 since
Pf ,D  Pf ,d . We further assume that the original design parameters were
	
 d
 

 
24, tref,d  1.3 hr,  d  1.67,  d  40	 (27)
The parameters chosen are typical for Kevlar flight quality vessels that are currently being used to
computer reliability of orbiter COPVs. With the aid of Equations (2) and (14) one calculates the fiber
stress ratio Sop to be 0.4299. Finally, suppose we place Nfl = 10 fleet leaders on test and choose Pfalse alarm =
0.01; That is, we set the probability to be 1/100 that at least one of the 10 fleet leaders fails when
governed by the original design parameters. The required fleet leader stress ratio can be calculated using
Equation (14) as Sfl = 0.529.
In order for the fleet leaders to be useful, however, they must be capable of detecting a problem with
the design and fabrication of the service vessel whereby the actual parameter values are degraded relative
to those assumed in the design. For instance, we suppose that a key manufacturing process in the fiber or
overwrap was mishandled and the true parameter values are instead
D  19, tref,D  0.95 hr, D  1.79, D  34
	 (28)
and again Nop = 4. Then using Equation (20) we calculate,
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meaning the reliability under the degraded set of parameters values is RD = 0.9989.
The probability of at least one fleet leader failing, and thus sounding a true alarm, can be calculated
for this degraded set of parameters using Equation (26) as

	

D 	 1 
 

—
D
D l d
 td 	
 d tref,d 	 Pfalse alarm	
Pt  alarm  1  exp N  fl tref,d
	
tref,D 	 Nfl (30)


 0.956
Viewed another way, the probability the set of fleet leaders fails to sound a true alarm when they
should (i.e., they all survive) is 0.044 or about 1/23. If one wishes to improve the probability of a true
alarm then one might raise the probability of a false alarm to Pfalse alarm = 0.015 = 1/67. Then a repeat of
the above calculation gives Ptrue alarm = 0.988, or failure to sound a true alarm now of (1–0.988) = 0.012 =
1/83. This illustrates the tradeoff in terms of having to raise the chance of a false alarm in order to raise
the probability or reliability of the fleet leaders in sounding a true alarm, or in other words, the sensitivity
of the fleet leaders to uncovering a serious design or material issue. One further observation is that, if the
false alarm probability must be preserved at a low level, then the true alarm sensitivity must be increased
by increasing the number of fleet leaders, Nfl.
An interesting aspect of this result is that a different set of damage parameters will give a somewhat
different result with respect to a true alarm. For instance we consider the parameter set
D  18, tref,D  0.90 hr, D  2.22, D  40	 (31)
Then we calculate Pf,D = 0.00108 or RD = 0.9989 and the probability of a true alarm is Ptrue alarm = 0.99998.
Here we could lower the probability of a false alarm to Pfalse alarm = 0.005 = 1/200 and a quick calculation
shows that failure of a true alarm is about the same at 1–P true alarm = 1/224. These two values are more
desirable than the values in the previous, even though the number of service and fleet leader vessels is the
same.
One important role of fleet leaders is to give an early warning that the reliability of flight vessels to
the end of the design life may be inadequate. In the example just considered we can calculate the
probability of failure of a service vessel versus time for the design parameters and degraded parameters,
and also do the same for the fleet leaders. We therefore plot
F4,d
 

 
t; S
op 
 
 1  exp   4  0.4299 
40
 

 t/1.3 1.67  	 (32)
F4 D  t; Sop   1  exp  4 0.4299 
40
  t/0.90 2.22  	(33)
F10, d  t; Sfl   1  exp   10  0.5290 
40
  t/1.3 1.67  	 (34)
and
F10 D  t; Sfl   1  exp   1 00.5290 
40
  t/0.90 2.22  	(35)
Figure 1 shows the results.
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Figure 1.—Operating curves for a Kevlar COPV Fleet Leader Program to
guard against possible design/manufacturing flaws and poor material
quality.
One sees in Figure 1 that a Fleet leader vessel would become likely to fail and ‘sound the alarm’
(reach 0.5 probability of failure) by 3 years, but at one year it is only about one-in-twenty. However, the
probability of failure of a service vessel is very low by then. Once again if the advance warning (3 years)
is deemed not good enough, then one must consider raising the number of fleet leaders so that warning
can be had sooner.
Case 2: Carbon/Epoxy Fleet Leaders
Carbon composite overwrapped pressure vessels are currently more popular and fast replacing the
existing Kevlar vessels. They are deemed to have a far superior stress rupture life performance compared
to their Kevlar counterparts. As before, suppose we have four carbon fiber/epoxy overwrapped vessels
instead of Kevlar vessels that are put into service and must have a design life of 10 years, i.e.,
td = 87,600 hr at a reliability level of Rd = 0.999999 (six nines) or probability of failure Pfd = 0.000001.
We also assume the critical reliability for corrective action due to damage to be 0.999 or the probability of
failure, Pf,D = 0.001. This means that D
crit 
 1 / 2 since Pf ,D  Pf ,d . We assume the design parameters
are
 d
 
 120, tref,d  1.0 hr,  d  0.25,  d   d d  30	 (36)
Then the lifetime distribution Equation (1) becomes
0.25
F4  t; Sop   1  exp 
j
4
 r[  Sop 
120 
t
1
1.0 
 (37)
	
4  Sop 
30 
 t/1.0 0.25 ,	 t >– 0
The fiber stress ratio for this case is
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1/ d
	1/30
	
S 
—

 ln Rd 

	 0.000001	
= 0
. 5480	 38op
	 F  4  87600 0.25 	( )N
op 
 
td
 /tref,d
Suppose we then place Nfl = 10 fleet leaders on test and choose Pfalse alarm = 0.01 that at least one of the
10 fleet leaders fails simply due to the original design being correct. The required stress ratio is
f
d
	1/30
	
S — 
 ln  1  Pfalse alarm  	

	 0.01005
	
 0.7226
	
(39)fl
	
Nfl  td Itref,d 
 d

10  87600 0.25
In order for the fleet leader program to be useful, however, it must be capable of detecting a problem
with the design/fabrication or material quality of the service vessel whereby the actual parameter values
are degraded relative to those assumed in the design. For instance, we suppose that a key manufacturing
process in the fiber or overwrap was mishandled, and the parameter values are instead
D  80, tref,D  1.0 hr, D  0.225, D  18	 (40)
and again Nop = 4. Then we calculate
80

0.225
	87600 1 120 1	 0.000001 18/30
	
PfD  4
 ( 1.0 )
	
( 1 	 	 4	 )	 (41)
 	

 0.00103
or reliability RD = 0.9989 for the service vessels governed by the degraded parameters, Equation (40). For
the fleet leaders also with the degraded parameter set, we calculate

	 1 
 

—
D
	

D 	
D l d
 td 	
 d
 tref d	 Pfalse alum	
Ptrue alarm  1  exp Nfl tref,d
	
tref,D 	 Nfl (42)


 0.3097
Viewed another way, the probability a fleet leader fails to sound a true alarm when it should is 1–0.3097
= 0.6903, which is far too high. To improve the probability of a true alarm then one must raise the
probability of a false alarm. For instance if the fleet leader stress ratios is raised to Sfl = 0.789 then we
obtain Pfalse alarm = 0.143 = 1/7 and Ptrue alarm = 0.841 but this implies a probability of failing to sound a true
alarm of 1–0.841 = 0.159 1/6 which while a significant increase, is still not satisfactory.
As in the previous example, we can calculate the probability of failure of a service vessel versus time
for the design parameters and degraded parameters, and also do the same for the fleet leaders. Thus in
Figure 2 we plot
	
F4 d   t; Sop   1  exp  4  0.548 
30
 

 
t 
0.25 

	 (43)
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F(t ; S ) =1– ex –4(0.548 )18 t 0 225	 44
F1 0, d ( t; Sfl) =1– exp{ –10( 0.789) 30 ( t ) 0.25 1 	 (45)
and
F1 0,D ( t; Sfl) =1– exp{ –10(0.789) 18 ( t )0.225 1	 (46)
Clearly evident in Figure 2 are the high probabilities of both a false alarm and failure to sound a true
alarm.
Case 3: Design of Fleet Leaders for T1000G Fiber COPVs for Constellation Program.
In this example we consider a hypothetical fleet leader program design for Constellation Program. Let
us say the typical vehicle is to carry 20 COPVs at a burst factor (design burst pressure/maximum
operating pressure) of about 2.0. This translates approximately to a stress ratio of 50 percent. The
properties used are for a typical T1000G fiber overwrap. The parameters chosen for the model are Pd =
72, tref ,d = 0.001 hr, Rd = 0.35. These are expected values of parameters for a flight size T1000G
overwrapped pressure vessel based on very limited data that is available in literature. The model
parameters chosen to represent pressure vessels with potential errors in design, materials quality control
or manufacturing are PD = 50, tref ,D = 0.001 hr, RD = 0.20. The reduced parameters would lead to a much
lower reliability than acceptable levels by the strict program requirements. Number of fleet leaders
needed and the operating conditions for the fleet leaders are considered as design parameters and are
estimated based on the models developed in the current work.
Weibull Probability Plot
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Figure 2.—Operating curves for a carbon COPV Fleet Leader Program
to guard against possible design/manufacturing flaws and poor material
quality.
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Figure 3.—Fleet leader design space for carbon Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels.
A family set of 10, 20, .... , 80 fleet leaders are considered to arrive at the desired settings for the
“false alarm” and “true alarm” as described below. The results are plotted in Figure 3. The horizontal axis
in the figure represents a ‘false alarm’, meaning the chance of a fleet leader failure due to natural
anticipated causes by the model. Both “failure to sound a true alarm” and “stress ratio” are plotted on the
vertical axis. Here “failure to sound a true alarm” means that despite high risk from processing errors the
fleet leaders have not sounded the alarm. As shown in the figure, under the assumed operating conditions
(stress ratio = 50 percent) and design life of 1 year (8760 hr) of continuous operation, the probability of
one of the 20 flight vessels failing due to degraded parameters of the model (to represent deficient or
damaged vessels during manufacturing) is about 0.16. Also plotted in the same figure are the fleet leader
stress ratios as a function of “false alarm”. For a “false alarm” setting of 0.02 (chance of natural fleet
leader failure), it can be seen from the figure that we need at least 20 or more vessels in the fleet leader
program to make sure that a true alarm sounds with 95 percent certainty. The stress ratios needed for the
fleet leaders in order to keep the false alarm setting at 0.02 is around 60 percent which is significantly
higher than the operating stress ratios in the fleet. False alarms cause costly program and schedule
disruptions. In order to minimize such disruptions it is always desirable to reduce this setting to a lower
value. For example, if we set false alarm to 0.01 (which corresponds to about 0.55 percent stress ratio)
then from the figure we can see that the number of fleet leaders have to be increased to 25 or more so that
the failure to sound a true alarm is less than 5 percent. The costs of schedule disruptions must be carefully
weighed against the cost of keeping more fleet leaders in the program to set the optimum settings for the
false alarm. The present methodology provides the necessary mathematical framework to perform such
trade studies before setting up a fleet leader program.
Fleet Leader Issues: Carbon vs. Kevlar
Based upon the above results for the three different cases for Kevlar and carbon COPVs we can
summarize the following critical issues for setting up fleet leader programs.
(1) One difficulty in the case of carbon COPVs is that the probabilities do not change very rapidly
with time. The probabilities of a false alarm or true alarm are both high in the first few hours but the
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growth rate rapidly slows. This is because the Weibull lifetime shape parameter values are very low (O d =
0.25 and RD = 0.225), and thus, there is a strongly decreasing hazard rate with time. The case with Kevlar
COPVs was very different. In that case (O d = 1.67 and RD = 2.5) so the hazard rate was strongly
increasing.
(2) Another difficulty is the major difference in sensitivity in the two cases with respect to false
alarms and true alarms. In the two Kevlar COPV cases, the probabilities of either giving a false alarm or
failing to sound a true alarm were both no more than 1/67 in the first example and about 1/200 in the
second example. In the carbon COPV case these probabilities were both much higher at about 1/7. For
carbon COPVs, this lack of discriminating ability lowers the usefulness of the fleet leaders. Unfortunately
the scenario cited is typical of what is seen in carbon/epoxy strand data where p values and a values can
vary widely among data sets and between vessels and strands for the same fiber. Changes of fiber or
matrix lead to large changes in model parameters.
(3) In the case of carbon COPVs, the stress ratios in the fleet leaders must be very high in order to
obtain reasonably balanced sensitivities for false and true alarms when both operate in the same real time.
In the above example, although a moderate design stress ratio, Sop = 0.548, is applied to the service
vessels, the fleet leader stress ratio, Sfl = 0.7226, despite being much higher, was poor at sounding a true
alarm, when the vessel parameters reflected serious degradation or damage. The fiber stress ratio had to
be raised to Sfl = 0.789 to balance the sensitivities to avoiding false alarms and sounding true alarms.
(4) Difficulties arise also when the fleet leaders are not truly identical to the service vessels and there
is uncertainty in exactly what the differences are. For instance in the carbon COPV case the fiber tress
ratio that was needed, Sfl = 0.789, is actually well above most proof test levels, typically 0.65 to 0.75.
While we have not considered proof testing in the above examples, the circumstances of the fleet leaders
and service vessels are immediately very different since ‘de facto’ they have different proof levels.
Unfortunately, proof testing by itself can introduce damage in terms of broken strands especially when
above 0.70. This becomes a critical parameter in the case of the fiber breakage reliability model (Refs. 2
and 13), which is more appropriate for carbon COPVs. Thus the relationship between the fleet leaders and
service vessels becomes more uncertain, which adds to the difficulty of evaluating sensitivities in terms of
true and false alarms.
(5) Finally, pure fleet leaders—i.e., vessels that are identical to service vessels in design, load and
environment except service vessels accumulate time at risk much more slowly—require less
sophistication in terms of a model than do fleet leaders that employ some form of acceleration. Despite
the longstanding scientific basis for pressure and temperature acceleration, particularly the latter using
Arrhenius laws, skepticism of engineers lacking sufficient foundation in probability and statistics as well
as the stress-rupture phenomenon itself can cloud proper interpretation of true alarm versus false alarm
sensitivities, when failures occur. If the underlying basis of these sensitivities is poorly understood, and
the number of fleet leader vessels insufficient, then the benefit of a fleet leader program is open to serious
question. The danger is that the observations over time—whether fleet leader failures occur or not—are
likely to be incorrectly interpreted and may be rationalized or even manipulated in decision making. The
risk is that truly degraded service vessels will end up being kept in service.
Conclusions
Stress rupture of composite overwraps can cause catastrophic consequences leading to loss of crew
and spacecraft and hence the reliability of these vessels during the entire duration of a space program
must be carefully examined and assessed. The present paper illustrates, via a classic stress rupture lifetime
model (Refs. 1 and 6 to 10), how one can statistically design a “fleet leader” program, including fiber
stress ratios and numbers of test vessels, as a risk mitigation step to supplement the original reliability
NASA/TM—2009-215685
	 16
calculations by analysis only, but with parameter values estimated using an available data base of similar
material systems. Furthermore, the considerable complications arising in the case of carbon COPVs, due
to widely differing model parameters for carbon versus Kevlar vessels, have been illustrated via specific
examples.
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